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The purpose of the First Amendment is to pro-
tect freedom of expression and to ensure an unin-
hibited marketplace of ideas.' The free press and
its mission have been described as "the beam of a
searchlight that move [s] restlessly about, bringing
one episode and then another out of the darkness
into vision."2 The First Amendment protects the
press as an institution because the framers of the
Constitution recognized the press' catalytic role
in providing diverse and controversial informa-
tion as imperative for a free and democratic soci-
ety.3 The press stirred the colonies to revolution,
energized the abolitionist movement, and served
as a voice of public rebuke to decrying the United
I COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RE-
SPONSIBLE PRESS 13 (1947). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
stated, in an oft quoted dissent, that the theory of our Consti-
tution is that the First Amendment protects speech because
"the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market . . . ." Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). See Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377, 384 (1969) (stating that the
public interest requires "ample play for the free and fair com-
petition of opposing views").
2 JAMES D. SQUIRES, READ ALL ABOUT IT! THE CORPORATE
TAKEOVER OF AMERICA'S NEWSPAPERS 3 (1993) (quoting Wal-
ter Lippmann, the famous columnist). Traditionally the
press was a "people oriented, privately owned, public-spir-
ited, [and] politically involved enterprise." Id. at 223.
3 BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY XiX (1987).
"Diversity of expression was assumed to be the natural state
of enduring liberty." Id. See CoMMISsIoN ON FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS, supra note 1 (describing the pivotal role of the press in
American society).
4 COMMISSIoN ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 1, at
223-24.
5 Id. at 14 (describing the press as it existed at the time of
the Constitution's ratification).
6 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248
(1974); see also COMMISSION OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra
note 1, at 14.
7 BAGDIKIAN, supTa note 3, at 4. By 1986, only fifteen
companies owned at least half of the daily newspaper busi-
ness. Gannett, the largest, owned 93 daily newspapers and
their total circulation exceeded 6,101,000 with Knight-Rid-
States' involvement in the Vietnam War.4
Since the ratification of the Constitution, the
newspaper industry has changed dramatically.5
States once held a multitude of diverse and pro-
vocative daily papers.6 Today, however, each city
typically has only one daily newspaper with the
majority of these papers owned by fifteen compa-
nies.7 The diversity of voices and viewpoints, once
prevalent, has been reduced by media concentra-
tion and economic homogeneity." Unlike broad-
casting, which has been regulated since its incep-
tion in order to ensure the diversity required by
the First Amendment,9 there is no legislation re-
stricting newspaper ownership or concentration.10
der, Newhouse, Times Mirror, Tribune Company as the next
five companies, in order of size of ownership. Id. at 20-22.
8 Id. at xix-xxi. The United States has a plethora of mass
communication outlets, including 1,700 daily newspapers,
11,000 magazines, 900 radio and 1,000 television stations. If
each of these media had different owners, there would be
many different voices and viewpoints. Id. The mass media
are large conglomerates that have become more conformist
in order to appeal to larger audiences. HILLIER KRIECHBAUM,
PRESSURES ON THE PRESS 141 (1972).
9 When the technology of radio first became popular,
the Commerce Department began controlling spectrum allo-
cations. The Supreme Court eventually stripped the Com-
merce Department of most of its authority to regulate broad-
cast spectrum. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003
(D.C. Cir. 1923) (denying the Secretary of Commerce the
power to deny a license to a legally qualified applicant even if
that license interfered with existing licenses); United States v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (1926) (holding that the
Secretary of Commerce was powerless to impose restrictions
on frequency, power, and hours of operation). See Nat'l
Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 211-213
(1942) (describing the evolution of broadcasting medium
and regulation).
10 The only statute affecting newspaper ownership is the
Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1970)
("NPA"). The NPA is an anti-trust exemption which allows
two competing papers to combine business operations if one
of the papers is determined to be "failing" under the statute.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1970).
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This Comment discusses the regulation of news-
papers and broadcasters under different First
Amendment methodologies and analyzes the
soundness of this inconsistency in light of the cur-
rent state of media concentration. First, this
Comment reviews the evolution of the scarcity
doctrine and the public interest in diversity which
justifies regulation of the broadcast industry.
Continuing, this Comment examines the level
and type of First Amendment protections that are
applied to the print media. Next, this Comment
focuses on the trend of concentration in newspa-
per ownership, the effects thereof, and the con-
current breakdown of the scarcity doctrine and
the resulting atmosphere of deregulation present
in the broadcasting industry. Finally, this Com-
ment analyzes the rationale justifying different
First Amendment standards that are afforded
newspaper and broadcasters and suggests that
there is a public interest in implementing struc-
tural regulations to ensure diversity in the newspa-
per industry.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT TREATMENT
OF MEDIA AND THE SCARCITY
DOCTRINE
Justice Holmes stated that the "ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas
13 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
12 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964);
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stat-
ing that "[I]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to pre-
serve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail").
1s See Richard A. Hindman, Applying Time Worn First
Amendment Assumptions to New Technologies, 38 CATH. U. L.
REv. 471, 473-74 (1989). "In the current debate over the
broadcast media and the First Amendment . .. each debator
claims to be the real protector of the First Amendment."
FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD Guys AND THE
FIRsT AMENDMENT (1975) (quoting Judge J. Skelly Wright,
U.S. Court of Appeals (D.C.) in a speech before the National
Law Center, George Washington University, June 3 1973).
14 Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press: A New First Amend-
ment Right, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641, 1666-78 (1967); David L.
Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the
Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C. L. REv. 1,
8-9 (1973). See generally Hindman, supra note 13.
15 U.S. CONsT. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
Id. This black-letter law approach accepts the language of
the First Amendment without question. Smith v. California,
[and] that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market."" The Supreme Court has stated
that the purpose of the First Amendment is to
provide an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.12
The marketplace of ideas concept created a sharp
split between parties advocating different meth-
ods of achieving this First Amendment ideal.' 3
The proponents of government regulation of the
media to achieve First Amendment goals' 4 are di-
ametrically opposed to those who follow the First
Amendment's strict language forbidding Con-
gress to make any law "abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press."' 5
A. The Scarcity Principle and the Public
Interest
The first mass medium to experience govern-
mental regulation was the broadcasting indus-
try.' 6 The justification for this First Amendment
interference is based on the unique limitations of
the broadcast spectrum.' 7 Prior to regulation,
broadcasting was chaotic and so overrun that the
reception of individual stations was nearly impos-
sible."' Congress decided that the electromag-
netic spectrum, as a finite resource, should be reg-
ulated to ensure diversity within the limited
broadcast spectrum.19 Out of this need for regu-
361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (BlackJ., concurring) (writing that
"no law" means no law); See generally Hindman, supra note 13.
16 Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
211-13 (1943). Since the inception of radio, the government
has undertaken the regulation of broadcast spectrum. In
1912, Congress passed the Radio Act, which forbade radio
operators to transmit without a license. Pub. L. No. 62-264,
37 Stat. 302 (1912). As radio grew more popular, the spec-
trum became congested, but the Commerce Department's
power to regulate the spectrum was questioned. This led the
Commerce Department to abandon all efforts of radio regu-
lation. In response to this, Congress passed the Radio Act of
1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). The Radio Act is now
incorporated into the Communications Act of 1934, which
created the Federal Communications Commission and
granted them wide licensing and regulatory powers. 48 Stat.
1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996)); see
also National Broadcasting, 319 U.S. at 211-12.
17 National Broadcasting, 319 U.S. at 213. See generally Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
18 National Broadcasting, 319 U.S. at 212.
19 See id. at 213-16 (discussing the rationale behind the
Act). Part of Congress' motivation was the "fear that in the
absence of governmental control the public interest might be
subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcast-
ing field." FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137
(1940). See also Barron supra note 14, at 1666-68.
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lation, Congress created what is now known as the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to
regulate the spettrum and license broadcasters. 20
The Supreme Court reviewed the constitution-
ality of the FCC's licensing regulations in National
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United States and con-
cluded that "[t]he right of free speech does not
include . . . the right to [broadcast] without a li-
cense."2' The Supreme Court justified this First
Amendment intrusion on broadcasters by distin-
guishing the broadcast medium from other media
due to the technological limitations of the spec-
trum.22 The decision in National Broadcasting as-
sumes that the basis of the FCC's jurisdiction is
the public interest created by allocational scar-
city.23 The Court held that broadcast licensing, if
exercised in the public interest, does not infringe
on freedom of speech. 2 4 This reflects both Con-
gress' adoption and the Supreme Court's ap-
proval of the regulate-to-achieve-diversity ap-
proach to the broadcast medium.25
B. Different Levels of First Amendment
Protection and Content Regulation in the
Public Interest
The Supreme Court established and defined
the modern theory differentiating the First
20 When Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat.
1162, they created the Federal Radio Commission to regulate
the broadcast spectrum by assigning specific frequencies to
applicants; that agency was replaced by the Federal Commu-
nication Commission.. National Broadcasting, 319 U.S. at 213-
14 (discussing the evolution of the FCC),
21 Id. at 227. There are "certain basic facts about radio
... its facilities are limited; they are not available to all who
may wish to use them; the radio spectrum simply is not large
enough to accommodate everybody." Id., 319 U.S. at 213; see
also KATHERINE M. GALVIN, MEDIA LAw: A LEGAL HANDBOOK
FOR THE WORKINGJOURNALIST 173-74 (1984).
22 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376-77
(1969).
23 National Broadcasting, 319 U.S. at 213; see also Red Lion,
395 U.S. at 367.
24 GALVIN, supra note 21 at 174. Under the Commerce
Clause, Congress has the power to legislate in the public in-
terest. National Broadcasting, 319 U.S. at 216. Congress, by
using the public interest, convenience, or necessity standard
as the mechanism, avoided any First Amendment infraction.
LucAS A. PowE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FiRST
AMENDMENT 12 (1987). If government establishes that a pub-
lic interest exists, infringing on First Amendment rights isjus-
tified and constitutionally acceptable. See In re Hinchey v.
Pub. Comm'n of New York, 144 A.D.2d 136, 1138 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1988).
25 Hindman,' supra note 13, at 483, 486 (discussiig the
First Amendment's underlying goals of diversity).
Amendment rights of broadcasters from those of
newspapers in two landmark cases: Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC and Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo.26 In Red Lion, the Court took the regu-
late-to-achieve-diversity approach even further by
holding that regulations mandating a right-of- re-
ply in the broadcast industry served First Amend-
ment goals and were constitutionally acceptable. 27
These regulations, referred to as the Fairness Doc-
trine,28 provide that "broadcasters have certain
obligations to afford reasonable opportunity for
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of
public importance." 2 9 The Court found that the
rights of the viewers and listeners were paramount
and that the Fairness Doctrine served the public
interest.30 Under this public interest standard,
the Supreme Court allowed the FCC to overrule
broadcaster's editorial judgment and control of
content, which lies at the heart of First Amend-
ment protection, and held that the Fairness Doc-
trine was constitutionally acceptable.31
Since Red Lion's initial imposition on broad-
caster's freedom of expression, the Supreme
Court has consistently applied different First
Amendment standards to broadcasting than it
does to the print media.32 This inconsistent appli-
cation of First Amendment rights is highlighted in
Tornillo, where the court held that content regula-
26 See Red Lion and Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S.- 241 (1974). In Red Lion, the broadcaster carried a
program series entitled "The Christian Crusade" and during
this program Rev. BillyJames Hargis attacked an investigative
reporter who had authored a critical biography of Barry
Goldwater. When the broadcast station refused to allow the
reporter an opportunity to reply to Hargis' attack, this dis-
pute found its way to the Supreme Court. The Court unani-
mously endorsed the right to defend oneself and emphasized
the importance of the public's access to ideas and their right
to be fully informed. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 365-68.
27 PowE, supra note 24, at 12.
28 See Donald E. Lively, Modern Media and the First Amend-
ment: Rediscovering Freedom of the Press, 7 WASH. L. Ruv. 599,
602 n.18 (1992). Fairness regulation was based upon the
idea that scarcity of radio frequencies enables the govern-
ment "to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose
views should be expressed on this unique medium." Red
Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
29 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1996).
30 Red Lion,'395 U.S. at 367.
31 Id.. at 387-90.
32 The Supreme Court has held that differences between
types of media justify unique First Amendment standards ap-
propriate for each medium. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (finding that a statute granting
a right of response in newspapers was unconstitutional); Red
Lion, 395 U.S. at 367 (upholding the Fairness Doctrine).
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tion in the form of a right-of-reply is unconstitu-
tional when applied to newspapers because it in-
fringes on editorial autonomy.3 3  The Supreme
Court recognized that there were economic barri-
ers making entry into the newspaper market diffi-
cult but specifically rejected economic scarcity as
a justification for content regulation of newspa-
pers.34 The Court, without referencing Red Lion
and the scarcity doctrine, explained that in-
dependent editorial control of newspapers was
necessary to achieve the "widest possible dissemi-
nation of information from diverse and antagonis-
tic sources." 35 Emphasizing the unique role of
newspapers in our society, the Court said that any
imposition on editorial control was clearly uncon-
stitutional.3 6 In Tornillo, the Supreme Court ad-
hered to the black-letter law of the First Amend-
ment prohibiting regulation of the press by
rejecting content control of newspapers in direct
contrast to the regulate-to-achieve-diversity ap-
proach taken to broadcasting in Red Lion.3 7
3 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 248. The Florida statute under re-
view required newspapers, which attacked the character of a
political candidate, to give free space in the newspaper for
the candidate to reply. Id. at 244.
34 Id. at 248-58.
35 Id. at 252, 256-58 (quoting Assoc. Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). Both Red Lion and Tornillo
focused on the same issue, the right-of-reply, and both were
unanimous decisions, however "neither the words Red Lion
nor Fairness Doctrine appear any place in the [ Tornillo] deci-
sion." FRIENDLY, sup-a note 13, at 193. "What is remarkable
about the Tornillo opinion . . . is not that it failed to apply
the precedent of Red Lion, but that it did not discuss the pre-
cedent at all." Id. at 195 (quoting Paul A. Freund, The Legal
Framework of the Tornillo Case, THE MIAMI HERALD V. TORNILLO:
THE TRIAL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 27 (Freedom of Infor-
mation Center, ed. 1975)).
36 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. The Court followed well-es-
tablished precedent in its decision to disallow government
enforced access to newspapers. See Assoc. Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 (1945) (refusing to enforce the
Association's bylaws creating a private compulsion to print);
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973) (reflecting a strong aversion to any attempt to
create a right of access to newspapers).
-1 See generally Lange, supra note 14, at 1, 8-9; Tornillo, 418
U.S. at 258; Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 367.
38 Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976
(D.R.I. 1983), vacated, 773 F.2d 382 (1985) (holding that the
appeal was rendered moot when the cable franchise was
awarded to another applicant without discussing the basis of
the lower court's decision). In Berkshire, a cable operator
sued a Rhode Island utility division seeking a declaratory
judgment holding regulations that required cable companies
to carry public, educational and governmental channels un-
constitutional because they violated the cable operator's First
Amendment rights. Id. at 979-80. The District Court in
Rhode Island found that the franchising process created a
While the economic scarcity argument was not
adequate justification for content regulation of
newspapers, it was successfully used to justify con-
tent regulation of cable programming.38 In Berk-
shire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, the District Court
said "scarcity is scarcity" and whether scarcity is
economic or allocational is irrelevant if it has the
effect of removing the means of expressing ideas
from all but a small group.39 The Berkshire court
distinguished Tornillo by saying that a pamphlet or
other inexpensive form of publication is an ade-
quate alternative when access to a newspaper is
denied and that cable offers no similar solution.40
C. Structural Regulation to Serve the Public
Interest in Diversity
Continuing to define the First Amendment
rights of broadcasters, the Supreme Court held
that ownership caps41 and co-ownership bans4 2
were constitutionally acceptable.43  It found that
natural monopoly that made it unlikely that another cable
operator would build a second cable system. Id. at 986. The
Court concluded that scarcity, even economic scarcity, man-
dated the application of the Red Lion standard. This ap-
proach ensured the confirmation of the Rhode Island regula-
tions as constitutional because they serve the public interest
in diversity. Id. at 986-88.
so 571 F. Supp. 976 at 986-87. The District Court con-
cluded that the access rules served governmental interests be-
cause the First Amendment goal of maintaining an unfet-
tered flow of information could be satisfied by having cable
television open to all Americans. Id. at 987-88.
40 Id. at 986.
41 The FCC amended the rules relating to multiple own-
ership and provided that licenses for broadcasting stations
will not be granted if "the applicant, directly or indirectly,
has an interest in other stations beyond a limited number."
United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 193 (1956).
42 See ICC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S.
775 (1978). The FCC's mass media regulations barred the
licensing or transfer of newspaper/broadcast combinations
when the final owner would control a radio or broadcast sta-
tion and a daily newspaper within the same community. See
generally Communications Act of 1934, §§ 301, 307(a),
307(d), 308(a), 309(a), 309(d) (as amended 47 U.S.C.
§§ 301, 307(a), 307(d), 308(a), 309(a), 309(d)) (authorizing
the FCC to grant, deny or revoke licenses).
43 Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 193 (1956). In Storer
Broadcasting, the plaintiff challenged the FCC's authority to
deny new television licenses to any party already owning five
such stations. The Court held that the FCC was within. its
authority to regulate television ownership to serve the public
interest. The Court found ownership limits to be in the pub-
lic interest because they ensured diversity which served First
Amendment goals. Id.; see also National Citizens Committee, 436
U.S. at 775. Here, the plaintiffs sought review of the FCC
regulations making co-ownership of a radio or television sta-
tion and a daily newspaper located in the same community
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these structural regulations ensured the presence
of diverse and antagonistic news sources that
served the public interest in obtaining diversity
and were consistent with First Amendment
goals.44 In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,
the Court easily found that ownership caps, which
limited the number of broadcast stations that any
one owner could hold, were constitutional. 45 In
ICC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,
the Court determined whether the FCC could
prohibit a single party from owning both a broad-
cast station and a newspaper in the same commu-
nity.46 Here, the Supreme Court scrutinized the
diversity argument carefully because the regula-
tion affected newspaper industry. The purpose of
co-ownership regulations was to ensure the diver-
sity of control of the mass communications media
in a given locale.47 Analyzing the possibility that
these structural regulations violated a person's
First Amendment rights to publish a newspaper,
the Court found that the co-ownership ban did
not preclude a person's ability to publish newspa-
impermissible. The Court held that regulations designed to
promote diversification were properly based within the pub-
lic interest and therefore the FCC had the authority to create
co-ownership rules. Further, the Court found that these reg-
ulations did not violate the First Amendment rights of news-
paper owners, saying that those owners could always buy a
radio or television station in a different locale. Id.
44 National Citizens Committee, 436 U.S. at 775; Storer Broad-
casting Co., 351 U.S. at 193.
45 351 U.S. 192 (1956). The FCC asserted that it may
promulgate rules to limit concentration of station ownership
to give concreteness to the standard of public interest. Id. at
201. See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 303 (1994) (giving the
FCC the power to create regulations necessary for the execu-
tion of its functions and identifying as one of these functions
the ability to make such regulations and prescribe such con-
ditions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
chapter, one key provision being a responsibility to regulate
in the interest of public convenience, interest, or necessity).
See also National Citizens Committee, 436 U.S. at 776 (stating
that, given the limited broadcast spectrum, regulation of the
frequencies is essential and nothing in the First Amendment
prevents this as long as the regulation promotes the "public
interest" in diversity).
46 National Citizens Committee, 436 U.S. at 797. The
Supreme Court held that the FCC is entitled to make ajudg-
ment based on its experience and that "it is unrealistic to ex-
pect true diversity from a commonly owned broadcast sta-
tion-newspaper combination. The divergency of their
viewpoints cannot be expected to be the same as if they were
antagonistically run." Id. at 797 (quoting In re Amendment
of Sections 73.34, 73,240, and 73.636 of the Commission's
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and
Television Broadcast Stations, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 53 F.C.C.2d 589 (released June 5, 1975)). Communi-
pers altogether and therefore did not raise any
First Amendment issues.48 The Court recognized
that the FCC's authorized purpose is to regulate
the mass media in a way that promotes the public
interest and, therefore, regulations which ensure
diversification, such as ownership caps and co-
ownership bans, are constitutional. 9
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEWSPAPER
AND BROADCAST INDUSTRIES
The Supreme Court's application of First
Amendment protections disallows direct content
regulation of newspapers by using a literal ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation.50 In di-
rect contrast, broadcasting is considered a scarce
and valuable national resource and, as such, is
regulated in the public interest to satisfy First
Amendment goals of diversity.51 As these differ-
ent First Amendment methodologies were being
developed, the newspaper and broadcast indus-
tries followed suit.5 2
cations Act of 1934, §§ 301, 307(a), 307(d), 308(a), 309(a),
309(d) (as amended in 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 307(a), 307(d),
308(a), 309(a), 309(d)) (forbidding one entity from owning
both a broadcast station and a newspaper in one commu-
nity).
47 National Citizens Committee, 436 U.S. at 781.
48 Id. at 776. The Court further stated that the prohibi-
tion on co-ownership of broadcast stations and newspapers
does not preclude a person's right to publish newspapers but
simply requires that they may not acquire a broadcast license
that would create a situation where the owner would broad-
cast and publish newspapers in the same community. Id.
The Court's reasoning enabled it to avoid applying the com-
pelling governmental interest standard normally warranted
in cases regarding the newspaper industry. See generally id.
49 See National Citizens Committee, 436 U.S. 775.
50 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974) (saying that it has not been demonstrated how gov-
ernment regulation of editorial control of newspapers can be
consistent with the guarantees of the First Amendment); Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding that
newspapers deserved full First Amendment protection and
governmental regulation of content would be unconstitu-
tional); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364, 374 (1984) (summarizing the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to First Amendment protections of newspapers and
broadcasters). See generally David L. Bazelon, The First Amend-
ment and the 'New Media '-New Directions in Regulating Telecom-
munications, 31 FED. COMM. L. J. 201, 202 (1979).
51 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 367; see also National
Broadcasting, 319 U.S. at 190.
52 See generally James Bennet, Time Out: We Pause For a
Word From Our Skeptic: Time-Warner Merger and Excessive Indus-
trial Concentration, THE NEW REPUBLIc, Apr. 1989, at 20
(describing the concentration of the media and its effects).
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A. The Newspaper Industry: Concentration and
Economic Homogeneity
Since 1909, the number of daily newspapers in
this country has fallen steadily from 2,600 to 1,700
in 1987.53 At the same time, population, literacy
and circulation have grown, which indicates that
more people are reading fewer papers.54 Not
only were newspapers becoming a scarce me-
dium,55 but ownership was also becoming concen-
trated in the hands of fewer corporations.5 6 In
the late 1950s, over 80% of the daily newspapers
were independently owned; but, by 1986, 72% of
the daily papers were owned by large corporations
and fifteen corporations dominated the daily
newspaper industry.57 This concentration of me-
dia ownership was created by the corporate de-
mand for acquiring highly profitable newspa-
pers58 and the inevitable transition of newspapers
from private ownership to media conglomerate
ownership.59 This trend, and the subsequent
economies of scale available to large corporate
53 CoMMIssioN ON FREEDOM OF THE PREsS, supra note 1,
at 36-37; see also NORMAN E. ISAACS, UNTENDED GATES: THE
MISMANAGED PRESS 101 (1986) (discussing the changing
newspaper industry); BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at xix (describ-
ing newspaper and media concentration).
54 COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PREss, supra note 1,
at 34; ISAACS, supra note 53, at 101-3.
55 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at 3.
56 CONRAD C. FINK, MEDIA ETHICS 142 (1995).
57 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at 4. Media groups control
over 80% of daily circulation and 90% of newspaper circula-
tion on Sundays. This is a result of a trend of newspaper and
broadcast stations passing from private ownership to publicly
held communications conglomerates. FINK, supra note 56, at
194.
58 See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at 12 (stating centraliza-
tion of media power was a result of pragmatic business man-
agement by which these corporations sought influence and
profits). Media conglomerates generally have large surpluses
which, if not invested, will be taxed as retained earnings.
FINK, supra note 56, at 197. Purchasing additional newspa-
pers is an attractive option because the industry has such
high profit margins; their return on investment is almost
double that of other industries. Maura Christopher, How
Profits Shape News Companies and the News, 117 SCHOLASTIC Up-
DATE, Apr. 1985, at 10. From 1985 to 1990, the average prof-
its of newspapers owned by public corporations ranged be-
tween 16.5% and 20.5%. Average profits are lower in towns
without monopoly papers but, even there, profits are real-
ized. SQUIRES, supra note 2, at 95. Profits in small to medium
sized papers in a monopoly situation can be as high as 30%.
In comparison, other U.S. industries have much lower profit
margins, typically around 6% to 7%. ,FINK, supra note 56, at
197.
59 Media groups are eager to buy daily newspapers and
many private owners find themselves selling papers to avoid
federal estate taxes. The estate tax is currently 50% of the
operators, has resulted in the presence ofjust one
daily newspaper in 98% of United States cities.60
Media conglomerate ownership has affected
the industry and altered news coverage. 61 There
is no substantial truth to the image of the ruthless
media corporation manipulating news coverage.
Modern day journalists are generally better edu-
cated and conventions against fictionalizing and
factual inaccuracy are widely endorsed.62 The ef-
fects of media concentration, however, are more
subtle: changing newspaper coverage, creating a
powerful lobby, and presenting a corporate per-
spective.
Newspaper coverage has been affected by the
corporate approach to management decisions
and general news coverage is skewed to favor cor-
porate values.6 - Media conglomerates try to maxi-
mize profits and please their shareholders64 and
local news coverage suffers because local news is
more expensive to produce.65 Not only have me-
dia groups changed the type of news covered,
fair market value of the property. FINK, supra note 56, at 197-
98. Additionally, media groups find newspapers such an ap-
pealing investment that the fair market value of an average
medium-sized newspaper could be up to 3 times its gross rev-
enue. Id. at 142. For example, a newspaper with $10 million
in gross revenues could be sold for $30 million to $50 million
dollars; with a fair market value of $30 million, a private
owner would owe $15 million dollars, immediately upon in-
heritance, to the IRS under its current 50% estate tax; if
these taxes can't be paid, the paper must be sold. This makes
it very difficult for private parties to hold. onto newspapers.
See id.
60 BAGDIKIAN, sup-a note 3, at 9. "In the newspaper in-
dustry, economies of scale have often led to dominant single
newspaper cities." Monroe E. Price, Taming Red Lion: The
First Amendment and Structural Approaches to Media Regulation.
31 FED. COMM. B.J. 215, 220-21 (1979). A new kind of central
authority over information has evolved, the national and
multinational corporation. These corporations were inter-
locked in common financial interest with other massive in-
dustries and with a few dominant international banks.
BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at xix.
61 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at 13-17.
62 Id. at 212.
63 Id. There are other things that can affect newspaper
coverage aside from economic efficiency, such as conflicts of
interest. The Los ANGELES TIMES owns agricultural land and
regularly reposts on water issues while focusing on the
farmer's needs, a perspective that furthers the Times' inter-
ests. It is hard to analyze the effect of this type of conflict has
on coverage. Christopher, supra note 58, at 11; Bennet, supra
note 52, at 20.
64 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at 90-2; Christopher, supra
note 58, at 10.
65 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at 212; SQUIRES, supra note 2,
at 216; see also Christopher, supra note 58, at 10 (discussing
the effect of media conglomerate ownership on newspaper
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they use the work of the journalists they employ
more efficiently.66 A media chain can have one
journalist write a story and use that story through-
out its chain of papers.67 Additionally, interna-
tional news, features, and comic strips can be
purchased inexpensively from the news services.68
One study found that independent newspapers
had 23% more local and national news than
chain-owned papers."
Another consequence of media concentration
is the creation of a powerful and unified lobby.70
In 1969, the seven largest newspaper groups, to-
gether owning only seventy-four papers, lobbied
for the passage of The Newspaper Preservation
Act ("NPA"). 7' This Act, which passed the follow-
ing year, allows publishers of competing papers
an anti-trust exemption to merge their business
operations if one of the papers is failing. 72 In re-
sponse to the Justice Department's initial opposi-
tion to the Act, the president of the Hearst Chain
wrote a letter telling Nixon that "many ... impor-
tant publishers and friends of your administra-
tion" wanted this bill passed and "look to you for
assistance."7" The Nixon Administration subse-
quently reversed its stance and the bill passed.74
A few papers, including the New York Times, lob-
bied against the legislation, calling it a "govern-
mental favor" that threatened "the independence
coverage).
66 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at 212.
67 Id.; see also SQUIRES, supra note 2, at 216-17.
68 SQuIRES, supra note 2, at 216-17.
69 Christopher, supra note 58, at 10.
70 See Sheila Kaplan, The Powers That Be Lobbying; One Spe-
cial Interest The Press Doesn't Cover: Itself 20 WASHINGTON
MONTHLY at 36 (Dec. 1988) (discussing the press' coverage of
itself and the press' influence on Capitol Hill).
71 SQuIREs, supra note 2, at 12. See The Newspaper Pres-
ervation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (1970).
72 See Suzanne Garment, 30 COLUM.JOURNALISM REv. 44,
47, 49 (Nov. 1991) (arguing that current media concentra-
tion defeats First Amendment goals and describing the pas-
sage of the Newspaper Preservation Act); see also BAGDIKIAN,
supra note 3, at 96-98 (discussing the passage of the Newspa-
per Preservation Act and the letters written to the Nixon Ad-
ministration).
7 There was another letter, written by Hearst, directed
at Nixon's antitrust chief, Richard McLaren, and forwarded
to Nixon, which stated "those of us who strongly supported
the present administration in the last election" were the most
concerned by the failure to pass the bill, and that "those
newspapers should, at the very least, receive a most friendly
consideration." Garment, supra note 72, at 48.
74 Id. Cox and Scripp-Howard fully supported Nixon
and were major beneficiaries of the NPA. These papers also
tended to suppress damaging Watergate stories. Id.
75 SQUIRES, supra note 2, at 12-13.
of the press."75 The newspaper lobby has signifi-
cant influence because of its control over hun-
dreds of media outlets.76
A third effect of corporate ownership of news-
papers is the lack of coverage on corporation or
newspapers themselves. Journalists have com-
mented that corporate owners are gun shy about
covering themselves, their influence, or their fi-
nancial peers.77 Newspapers rarely criticize cor-
porate America.78 A survey by the American Soci-
ety of Newspaper Editors found that 33% of all
editors working for media conglomerates said it
was unlikely that they would run a story that was
damaging to their parent corporation.79 Such
sentiment could be motivated by the fact that
every year there are reporters and editors who are
fired for covering a story the owning corporation
does not like. 0 However, some newspaper chains
that started with high-quality papers have contin-
ued to operate with sound, autonomous manage-
ment and to pursue quality content."' But the
impact of corporate ownership can have uninten-
tional and unavoidable effects such as built-in bi-
ases that protect corporate power and maintain
the status quo. 2 Media conglomerate ownership
of newspapers affects the industry and newspaper
coverage by influencing the legislature, politi-
cians, editors, and the reporters themselves.
76 In 1988, Knight-Ridder significantly toned down edito-
rials critical of the Attorney General and removed all edito-
rial cartoons about him. Garment, supra note 72, at 48. Ad-
mirably, a reporter for the independent Washington Post did
cover this story, commenting on the biased coverage and
stated that "it is such an embarrassment ... that few people
in the news business want to write about it." Id.
7 See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at xvi (commenting on the
lack of coverage of business). But seeJOHN QUIRT, THE PRESS
AND THE WORLD OF MONEY: How THE NEWS MEDIA COVER
BUSINESS AND FINANCE 4-9 (1993) (discussing the media's
thorough coverage of business and finance).
78 BAGDIKIAN, supTa note 3, at xvi. There is a double stan-
dard applied to the public and private sectors. Id. The press
is "sensitive to failures in public bodies, but insensitive to
equally important failures in the private sector, particularly
in what affects the corporate world." Id.
79 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at 30, 217.
80 Id. at 36-7. In August 1982, a journalist wrote.a story
for the Dallas Morning News about a bank's loan problems,
saying that the bank was likely to fail. The story enraged the
Bank Chairman, costing the reporter and the editor their
jobs. The reporter's story was fully confirmed less than two
weeks later when the bank failed and loan losses that ex-
ceeded its assets were discovered. Despite this, neither the
reporter nor the editor were rehired. Id.
81 IsAACS, supra note 53, at 21.
82 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at xv.
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B. The Scarcity Doctrine Crumbles and
Broadcast Regulations are Relaxed
In direct contrast to newspapers, the number of
broadcast stations has increased dramatically.83
The scarcity rationale, first approved in 1943,84
was a basis for distinguishing broadcast from
other media and justifying the regulation of the
broadcast industry.85  Since then, technological
improvements and the advent of cable have made
broadcast spectrum seemingly less scarce.8 6  In
1984, the Supreme Court commented that the ra-
tionale for broadcast regulation based on spec-
trum scarcity was suspect, 7 but that it was not pre-
pared to reconsider the scarcity doctrine without
some official indication from Congress.88 The
FCC invalidated the Fairness Doctrine in 1987 be-
cause it decided that it did not serve the public
interest and was not, in fact, appropriate under
the First Amendment. 9 Even the FCC noted the
increase of broadcast stations due to technologi-
83 Bazelon, supra note 50, at 207.
84 See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943) (introducing the scarcity doctrine).
85 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(approving Congress' scarcity rationale for granting the FCC
the authority to regulate the broadcast spectrum).
86 Bazelon, supra note 50, at 207 .
87 Federal courts recognized and commented on the
weakness of the scarcity rationale. "The number of broadcast
stations . . . rivals and perhaps surpasses the number of news-
papers and magazines." Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1459
(D.C. Cir. 1983). The Court in Media Access says that there is
nothing uniquely scarce about the broadcast spectrum and
" [e]mploying the scarcity concept as an analytic tool ... inev-
itably leads to strained reasoning and artificial results."
Telecom. Research and Action Ctr. and Media Access Project
v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
88 The Court recognized that the scarcity doctrine was
widely criticized, noting that even the Chairman of the FCC
questioned its validity. FCC v. League of Women's Voters of
Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984); see also Fowler & Bren-
ner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L.
REv. 207, 221-6 (1982).
89 In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Counsel Against
Television Station WTVH, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2
FCC Rcd. 5043, paras. 61, 98 (rel. Aug. 6, 1987); Charles D.
Ferris & Terrence J. Leahy, Red Lions, Tigers and Bears; Broad-
cast Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 38 CATH U. L.
REV. 299 (1989).
90 See FCC Report: General Fairness Doctrine Obliga-
tions of Broadcast Licensees, 102 FCC 2d 143 (1985).
91 Harry A. Jessell, Telcom Bill: A Deal, But Not Done,
BROADCAST AND CABLE, Jan. 1, 1996, at 18. The Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 relaxed limits of broadcast ownership
and also addressed other areas of telecommunications law.
See Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (as codified at 47
U.S.C. § 151). The Act changes current policy and allows
cable and telephone businesses to compete with each other
cal advances and that broadcasting is no longer a
scarce resource.90
In response to a perception of lack of scarcity,
the first large-scale modification of telecommuni-
cations law in sixty-one years was passed in Febru-
ary of 1996 with strong lobbying efforts from
many large media corporations.9' President Clin-
ton, among others,9 2 wrote that "the legislation
should protect and promote diversity of owner-
ship and opinions in the mass media."9 3 Also
showing concern about diversity, the Chairman of
the Television Board of the National Association
of Broadcasters ("NAB") resigned in protest when
the NAB refused to oppose efforts to raise televi-
sion ownership limits.9 4 Previously, the Supreme
Court said that they "fear that in the absence of
governmental control the public interest might be
subordinated to monopolistic domination in the
broadcasting field."9 5 In final form, however, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 relaxes broad-
and permits local telecommunications companies to enter
the long-distance market. Jessell at 91. Cap/ABC, CBS and
Clear Channel Communications, Fox, INTV and The Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters lobbied for removal of
caps on station ownership. Kim McAvoy, NAB Presses for Radio
Dereg, BROADCAST & CABLE, Apr. 3, 1995, at 14; Jessell, at 91;
Station Ownership Reaction Mixed, 35 TELEVISION DIGEST, May
22, 1991 at 2.
92 The Chief Operating Officer of Greater Media and
Network Affiliated Stations Alliance voiced concerns about
reduction of diversity. Cheryl Heuton, Radio's Dereg Dilemma:
Politicians, Stations Turn Up The Volume On Ownership Limits
Debate, MEDIAWEEK, Nov. 13, 1995, at 12 (stating that compe-
tition is important to the free expression of ideas and if there
are too few owners that will be lost). See generally TELEVISION
DIGEST, supra note 91, at 2 (stating that relaxing ownership
restrictions might undermine the agency's goals of diversity
and service).
93 Heuton, supra note 92, at 12.
94 Kim McAvoy & Don West, The Battle Over Bigness:
Broadcasting's Fatal Attraction, BROADCAST & CABLE, May 22,
1995, at 50. The Chairman of the television board of the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters was G. William Ryan who
resigned in May 1995 to protest the NAB's failure to oppose
the relaxation of television ownership limits. The Chairman
objected to regulations that would put broadcasting stations
into the hands of a few resulting in less diversity and fewer
voices. He said, "[i]f these kind of changes go through and
the large companies that emerge from it are allowed to verti-
cally integrate to the extent that I believe they will, the uni-
queness of broadcasting- and local broadcasting-and the serv-
ing of the public interest will go by the wayside." Ryan also
said that the existing 25% cap does not bother him, saying "if
it isn't broke why try to fix it?" Commenting on the large
media companies, Ryan said that the emerging companies
that believe in centralized control scare him. Id.
95 FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940);
see Barron, supra note 14, at 1666-68.
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cast ownership limits and the audience-reach cap,
which limits a group to reaching no more than
thirty-five percent of the nation's homes.9 6 The
Commission rules also eliminate national radio
ownership caps while sustaining local ownership
restrictions.9 7 Analysts predict that these meas-
ures will accelerate the industry's rate of consoli-
dation98 and thereby reduce diversity.99
III. THE SCARCITY DOCTRINE: A
RATIONALE TO JUSTIFY REGULATION
OF BOTH NEWSPAPERS AND
BROADCASTING TO ENSURE DIVERSITY
A. The Scarity Doctrine as Applied to News
Media
The varying First Amendment analysis of differ-
ent media is justified by the unique scarcity
problems presented by the broadcast medium.100
The regulation of broadcast frequency is consid-
ered constitutionally acceptable because the scar-
city of the medium required regulation to achieve
the presence of the diversity of viewpoints and
voices called for by the First Amendment. 01 The
scarcity doctrine, which creates the public interest
in broadcast regulation, can be explained in two
ways: numerical scarcity, which describes the
number of broadcast stations; and allocational
scarcity, which describes the reality that the spec-
trum is not large enough to accommodate every-
96 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminates the
12 station ownership cap on national television broadcasters
and increase the audience limit from 25% to 35%. Jessell,
supra note 91, at 18.
97 The statute directs the FCC to modify 47 CFR
§ 73.3555 (1996) to eliminate restrictions on the total
number of AM or FM broadcast stations or television stations
one person or entity could own within the United States but
retains significant local ownership limits. The statute also re-
laxes the caps placed on number of television broadcast sta-
tions that one person or entity can own within a particular
market. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104 § 303, 110 Stat. 133.
98 Jessell, supra note 91, at 18.
99 See Garment, supra note 72, at 51 (stating that the
FCC's plans "would remove the few remaining safeguards
that now prevent a handful of huge conglomerates from
owning and controlling all the means of mass communica-
tion in this country" and that further consolidation of the
electronic media would seriously undermine the diversity
that is vital for a healthy democracy).
100 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-3 (1952). The
Court commented that the basic principles of freedom of
speech and the press, while not absolute, are the rule. Fur-
ther, the Court said that for any exception to that rule there
one who might desire to use it.102 The Supreme
Court has used, at different times, both the nu-
merical and allocational approach to explain the
scarcity doctrine.103 There has been a trend to-
ward using the numerical scarcity approach 04 be-
cause the technological limitations creating allo-
cational scarcity have been reduced. 0 5 During
the early 1960s, the Supreme Court encouraged
the FCC to exercise its authority in order to
achieve the Congressionally-mandated goal of di-
versity.1 06 Thus the scarcity doctrine became the
basis for FCC control, calculated to promote the
First Amendment value of diversity in both owner-
ship and viewpoints.10 7
While the scarcity doctrine was created in re-
sponse to allocational scarcity, technological ad-
vances increasing the utility of the broadcast spec-
trum caused a shift in rationale from an
allocational scarcity approach to a numerical scar-
city approach. The regulate-to-achieve-diversity
approach applied to broadcasters is now justified
by numerical scarcity and the public interest in di-
versity. However, in recent times, there has been
a strong cultural move toward deregulation.08
Many people have argued that all media deserve
the same degree of First Amendment protection;
and most advocate strict adherence to the First
Amendment's mandate, which is currently ap-
plied to newspapers, to make no. law regarding
the press. 09 While a consistent approach to First
must be some justification. Id.
101 Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
213 (1942). See GALVIN, supra note 21, at 173-74.
102 National Broadcasting, 319 U.S. at 213 (assuming, in its
analysis, that allocational scarcity is the basis for the FCC's
jurisdiction); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400
(1969).
103 National Broadcasting, 319 U.S. at 190 (explaining the
scarcity doctrine by the allocational limitations created by the
spectrum); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 399-401.
104 See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364 (1984) (using the numerical scarcity approach in recog-
nition of the technological advances in broadcast resulting in
a greater number of broadcast stations).
105 See id.
106 Price, supra note 60, at 220.
107 Lively, supra note 28, at 602; FCC v. Nat'l Citizens
Comm., 436 U.S. 775, 797 (1978).
108 Price, supra note 60, at 220-21. See Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified
as amended § 47 U.S.C. § 151).
109 See New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking the




Amendment protection of the media seems logi-
cal, history has shown that, without regulation,
media concentration is an inevitable trend.1 0
It seems more reasonable to apply the scarcity
rationale to both newspapers and broadcasters
and to regulate both to achieve diversity. While
the newspaper industry does not suffer the tech-
nological limitations that create allocational scar-
city, it is numerically scarce.'' When the scarcity
rationale was first approved in 1943,112 the total
number of daily newspapers in the United States
was 2,043, contrasted with a total of 967 radio sta-
tions." 3 By 1987, the number of newspapers had
dropped to 1,646 while the number of radio sta-
tions has increased to 6,519.114 In additional to
numerical scarcity, there are economic barriers
making it almost impossible to start a new newspa-
per which creates economic scarcity.' 5 The scar-
city doctrine that now justifies broadcast regula-
tion pertains equally, if not more, to the
newspaper industry." 6
B. Structural Regulation of Newspapers is in
the Public Interest
Traditionally, the press has been given hands-
off treatment under the First Amendment's pro-
tection"' 7 because of the press' special role in so-
ciety."" Joseph Pulitzer defined that role as a re-
sponsibility for the press "to fight for progress and
reform, never tolerate injustice or corruption,
[oppose] demagogues of all parties [and chal-
lenge] public plunderers [while] remain[ing] de-
voted to the public welfare." 19 But experts say
that the present concentration of ownership in
the newspaper industry subverts that role, 120 af-
fects newspaper content, and reduces diversity
that is required by the First Amendment.' 2 ' One
effect of media concentration is that newspapers
are large business organizations and, as a result,
have become more conformist in order to appeal
to larger audiences. 122 Technology and society
have "intensified the problems of centralized con-
110 Newspapers are not a regulated medium. See
KRIECHBAUM, supra note 9. Ownership of newspapers has
gradually become more and more concentrated. FINK, supra
note 56, at 142. Broadcasting stations have become as con-
centrated as legally permissible. Garment, supra note 72, at
32. See alsoJessell, supra note 91 (discussing broadcast regula-
tion and broadcast concentration). President Clinton and
other industry experts feel that the deregulation effected by
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 will only cause even
greater concentration. Heuton, supra note 92, at 12; TELEVI-
SION DIGEST, supra note 91, at 2.
Ii U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1991, No. 919, at 556.
112 Nat'1 Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212-
14 (1943).
113 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES, Series R 232-243, at 810 (1975); STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 111, at 561.
114 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
notell5, at 810; Statistical Abstract of the United States,
supra note 111, at 556 (stating the number of radio stations
as 8,943); see also COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
supra note 1, at 37; BACDIKlAN, supra note 3, at xix (describing
newspaper and media concentration).
113 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
251 (1974) (describing the economic barriers to starting a
newspaper enterprise, but ultimately rejecting the economic
scarcity argument as justifying newspaper regulation). Gan-
nett, the largest newspaper chain, actually had the resources
to start a new daily newspaper, USA TODAY, which lost consid-
erable amounts of money for over ten years until it finally
turned profitable in 1993. FINK, supra note 56, at 203.
1 16 At the time the scarcity rationale was first adopted in
1943, the total number of daily newspapers in the United
States was 3,043 as compared with a total of 967 radio stations
and 8 television stations. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UN-
TIED STATES, supra note 111 and accompanying text). See gen-
erally National Broadcasting, 319 U.S. at 190, 198-200 (intro-
ducing the allocational scarcity doctrine).
117 Bazelon, supra note 50, at 202.
118 See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 250-55 (describing the role a
widely held press plays in effectuating the First Amendment).
119 Joseph Pulitzer said, "A free press should always fight
for progress and reform, never tolerate injustice or corrup-
tion, always fight demagogues of all parties, never belong to
any party, always oppose privileged classes and public plun-
derers, never lack sympathy with the poor, always remain de-
voted to the public welfare." SQUIRES, supra note 2, at i.
120 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at 6. "Concentrated control
over public information is inherently antidemocratic." Id.
The large media companies universally insist that they im-
prove the newspapers they purchase; and a few actually have,
notably Knight-Ridder, Times Mirror, and the New York
Times Company. However, most media company have not
increased the quality of the newspapers they purchase. The
media conglomerates buy newspapers as investments and cut
quality and raise prices. No contemporary newspaper group
in the United States has ever created a respected daily paper -
with one exception, Knight-Ridder's Philadelphia Inquirer -
and the distinguished papers that do exist were created by
independent, non-corporate owners. Id. at 5-8.
121 See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at 6; COMMISSION ON
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 1; ISAACS, supra note 53, at
101; SQUIRES, supra note 2.
122 KRIEGHBAUM, supra note 8, at 141.
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trol of information" and, instead of small town
meetings and public gatherings, individuals now
depend on media conglomerates to provides
news.' 2 3
There is a public interest in maintaining the
presence of diverse voices and messages in both
newspapers and broadcasts.12 4 Excessive media
concentration affects the news content and
reduces the diversity of viewpoints of the pro-
grams and news carried by conglomerate owned
media outlets. 2 5 When considering the number
and impact of all media outlets together, the ef-
fect of corporate ownership could be seen as in-
significant.' 2 6 , However, the large media con-
glomerates have centralized control of all types of
media outlets, including: television, radio, cable,
magazines and newspapers.12 7
Although allocational scarcity created the pub-
lic interest justification for broadcast regulation
intrusion onto First Amendment rights, the cur-
rent state of media concentration should justify
continued structural regulation of the broadcast
industry and new structural regulation of the
newspaper industry.
IV. CONCLUSION
Newspapers are a scarce medium because own-
ership is concentrated in the hands of a few cor-
porations, creating a lack of diversity in newspa-
per coverage. Newspaper publishing has become
big business and this has changed the industry
and altered news coverage. When blocks of news-
papers are all less inclined to report on their par-
ent company, or other corporations generally,
and when the daily newspaper voices that are
heard are homogenized through their unified
economic interest, diversity is reduced signifi-
123 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at xx. "The modern systems
of news, information, and popular culture are not marginal
artifacts of technology. They shape the consensus of society."
Id.
124 Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 213
(1942); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at 5-7 (discussing the impact of con-
centration of newspaper ownership on diversity of content).
125 See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3
candy and competing or antagonistic viewpoints
are diminished. Diversity of voices and viewpoints
are the critical components of the press that the
First Amendment aims to protect.
A potential solution that would increase the
number of voices and viewpoints would be to
abandon the literal-interpretation approach to
the First Amendment prohibition of regulation of
the press and apply a regulate-to-achieve-diversity
approach to the newspaper industry. A cap on
the number of existing daily papers any corpora-
tion can own or purchase, similar to the owner-
ship cap that applies to broadcasters today, would
increase the diversity of voices and viewpoints
present in newspapers. It is not reasonable to as-
sume that one paper could represent all of the
conflicting viewpoints regarding public issues but,
as a whole, the industry, with diversified owner-
ship, could be expected to do so.
This proposed solution follows previous
Supreme Court holdings which allowed regula-
tion of broadcasting, based the scarcity rationale,
to ensure the First Amendment value of diversity.
Further, this proposal does not make the press'
First Amendment right to publish ineffective; the
ability to publish would just be limited to allow
others the same privilege. It is antithetical to the
purpose of the First Amendment to use the lan-
guage of the freedom of speech and press clause
to protect this current concentration and lack of
diversity in the newspaper industry. The press
earned constitutional protection because it served
a critical function in American society and, be-
cause that function of diversity of information and
viewpoints is not being served the type of protec-
tion provided by the First Amendment should be
changed.
126 KRIEGHBAUM, supra note 8, at 156. Diversity of voices
and viewpoint can be achieved through the different media.
"A 1971 survey showed that 37 ... of the 1,511. newspaper
communities had two of more fully competing voices [but]
[a]n earlier study which included the competition of televi-
sion and radio found a total of 5,079 competing voices and
202 communities with common ownerships." Id.
127 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 3, at 13-17.
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